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The main goal of this paper is a quantitative identifi cation of bear market periods during the 2007–
2009 global fi nancial crisis in the case of the Visegrad Group stock markets. We analyse four 
countries, namely Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia and, for comparison, the 
US stock market. The sample period begins on May1, 2004, and ends on April 30, 2013, i.e. it 
includes the 2007 US subprime crisis. We use the statistical method of dividing market states into 
bullish and bearish markets. Our results reveal October 2007–February 2009 as the common down-
market period of the recent global fi nancial crisis, except for Slovakia. It is instructive to formally 
identify crises, as it enables sensitivity analyses of various relationships and linkages among inter-
national stock markets using econometric and statistical tools, with respect to the pre-, post- and 
crisis periods. Moreover, we investigate the effect of increasing cross-market correlations in the 
crisis compared to the pre-crisis period, applying both standard contemporaneous correlations and 
volatility-adjusted correlation coeffi cients. The results confi rm that accommodating heteroskedas-
ticity is critical for detecting contagion across economies. A number of studies document that cross-
market correlations vary over time, thereby making the benefi ts of international portfolio choice 
and diversifi cation questionable.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As argued by Southall (2008: 1), “Subsequent to the dismantling of the Soviet 
Union in the 1990s, improved political stability and reforms have substantially 
changed the economic environment in the Central and Eastern European econo-
mies”. An event that had a significant impact on a group of eight Central and East-
ern European (CEE) emerging markets was the accession to the European Union 
(EU) on May 1, 2004. Among others, four Visegrad countries (V-4, i.e. Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) were successful in the negotiations 
with the EU and they accessed the EU. The financial integration between the V-4 
and developed markets has critical implications for stock market comovements. 
For this reason, the V-4 markets are particularly interesting in many respects, also 
in the context of the recent global financial crisis. Many researchers stress that 
given their varied histories, it is crucial to investigate and compare stock markets 
in the V-4 countries. It is worth recalling that formal stock markets were created 
in Poland and Hungary at the beginning of 1991. Exchanges in Warsaw and Bu-
dapest started with very few firms and adopted a process of applying regulations 
and listing requirements to provide for the expansion of the market.1 On the other 
hand, stock markets in the two parts of the former Czechoslovakia (i.e. the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia) were created in mid-1993, and they came about as a by-
product of voucher privatisation (Hanousek – Filer 2000: 624). 
The main contribution of this paper is a quantitative identification of bear mar-
ket periods on the V-4 stock markets and, for comparison, on the US stock mar-
ket. The sample period begins with the Visegrad Group’s accession to the EU on 
May 1, 2004, and ends on April 30, 2013, and it includes the 2007 US subprime 
crisis period. We use the method of dividing market states into bullish and bearish 
markets (Pagan – Sossounov 2003). This procedure enables the detection of cy-
cles in equity prices. Our results reveal October 2007–February 2009 as the com-
mon down-market period during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, except 
for Slovakia. The precise identification of market states, especially during the 
crisis, is crucial because of the many practical implications in the light of market 
globalisation as well as international portfolio choice and diversification. To the 
best of the authors’ knowledge, no such research has been undertaken jointly for 
the Visegrad Group and the US stock markets. 
1  After the re-establishment, the Warsaw Stock Exchange held its first trading session on April 
16, 1991 with five listed companies, all of which were formerly state-owned companies that 
had been privatised. Similarly, on June 21, 1990, the Budapest Stock Exchange reopened its 
doors with only one single equity to trade – IBUSZ. 
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Furthermore, we investigate the effect of increasing cross-market correlations 
in the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period in the context of contagion, ap-
plying both the standard contemporaneous cross-correlations and volatility-ad-
justed cross-correlation coefficients proposed by Forbes – Rigobon (2002), who 
stressed that market return volatility can bias standard cross-correlations. Our 
results directly confirm that accommodating heteroskedasticity is critical for de-
tecting contagion across economies.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
literature review concerning the US subprime crisis and its influence on the Euro-
pean markets. Section 3 specifies the methodological background of the statisti-
cal method of dividing market states into bullish and bearish markets. In Section 
4, we propose a brief analysis of the effect of increasing cross-market correlations 
in bear markets, especially in crisis periods. In Section 5, we present data descrip-
tion and empirical results on the main indexes of the V-4 and US stock markets. 
Section 6 covers the main findings and presents the conclusions.
2. THE 2007 US SUBPRIME CRISIS – 
THE INFLUENCE ON THE EUROPEAN MARKETS
According to the literature (e.g. Calomiris 2009; Brunnermeier 2009; Claessens 
et al. 2010), the financial crisis timeline, from the US perspective, was marked 
by the following events: (1) the increase in subprime delinquency rates in the 
spring of 2007, (2) the ensuing liquidity crunch in late 2007, (3) the liquidation 
of Bear Stearns in March 2008, and (4) the failure of Lehman Brothers in Sep-
tember 2008. The US economy officially slipped into a recession following the 
peak in December 2007. It is important to note that the crisis began in the US, but 
initially it did not fully and strongly affect the emerging markets. Claessens et al. 
(2010) identified five groups of countries based on the date they were affected 
by the crisis. They asserted that Hungary entered recession in 2008Q2, together 
with the major Western European countries, i.e. the UK, France and Germany, 
while Poland and the Czech Republic slipped into recession in 2008Q4. Slovakia 
entered recession with a delay, in 2009Q1. It should be noted that the severity 
of the recent downturn was considerably smaller than elsewhere in the case of 
Poland. Poland was the only EU member state that showed real GDP growth in 
2009. The resilience of the Polish economy was particularly conspicuous when 
compared to other V-4 countries, whose economies shrank to a similar extent as 
the EU-15 (Konopczak – Marczewski 2011). Marer (2010) analysed the impact 
of the crisis on the Eastern European economies, and he stressed that the global 
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crisis hit Hungary immediately and hard, while Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia were less affected.
Unfortunately, there is no unanimity in determining the phases of the crisis 
among the researchers. For example, Pisani-Ferry – Sapir (2010) proposed two 
phases of the crisis in the EU. They advocated that the first phase started in Au-
gust 2007 with a general liquidity strain. The second phase started in September 
2008 with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Similarly, Mishkin (2011) divided 
the financial crisis into two distinct phases: the first from August 2007 to August 
2008, called the US subprime mortgage crisis, and the second, which started in 
mid-September 2008, known as the global financial crisis. Frank – Hesse (2009) 
found that end-February 2007 was a period when early signs of stress began to 
emerge in global markets prior to the time when the subprime crisis was revealed 
in mid-2007. Dooley – Hutchison (2009) investigated the links between the US 
and a broad range of emerging markets over a subprime crisis period from Febru-
ary 2007 to March 2009. They analysed three phases of the subprime crisis and 
they argued that the first phase of the crisis ran from February 27, 2007. The 
authors stressed that emerging markets were somewhat insulated and decoupled 
from the US from early 2007 to summer 2008. Mun – Brooks (2012) extended 
Dooley and Hutchison’s analysis to a broader set of developed and emerging 
markets, and also extended the whole sample period to February 2010. Kizys – 
Pierdzioch (2011) studied the collapse of the three biggest Central and Eastern 
European markets (CEE-3), i.e. of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary 
(except for Slovakia) during the recent financial crisis. They suggested that the 
most severe collapse in these markets occurred in November 2008, right after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Specifically, during the last three months of 
2008, the stock market indexes in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest showed a clear 
tendency to decrease. Calomiris et al. (2012) considered three “crisis shocks” 
related to key features of the 2007–2008 crisis for the emerging and developed 
economies: the collapse of global trade, the contraction of credit supply, and sell-
ing pressure on firms’ equity. They tested firms in the CEE-3 countries among 
other emerging markets. They advocated August 2007–December 2008 as the 
crisis period. Bartram – Bodnar (2009) proposed a detailed investigation of the 
global financial crisis 2008/2009 and provided a timeline of events and policy 
actions for the crisis in equity markets. They stressed that at the beginning of 
October 2007, world equity markets measured an all-time high USD market capi-
talisation of more than $51 trillion as of this date, whereas by the end of February 
2009, global equity market capitalisation stood at just over $22 trillion, that is, it 
dropped off more than 56%. However, as the Lehman collapse on September 15, 
2008 was a key event, they concluded that for their purposes the crisis period is 
defined as the close of the markets on Friday, September 12, 2008, to the close of 
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trading on Monday, October 27, 2008. Moreover, they proposed January 1, 2007–
September 12, 2008 as the pre-crisis period, and October 28, 2008–February 27, 
2009 as the post-crisis period. As a matter of fact, their choice of the post-crisis 
period seems to be rather controversial in the light of the stock market indexes 
continuing their decline during this period (cf. Figures 1–5). Olbryś – Majewska 
(2013) proposed February 27, 2007–March 9, 2009 as a crisis period, based on 
the S&P500 index decline. The overall S&P500 index fell from 1399.04 (Febru-
ary 27, 2007) to 676.53 (March 9, 2009) and it lost 51.64% of its previous value 
during the crisis period.
3. DIVIDING MARKET STATES
Fabozzi – Francis (1977) pointed out that there is more than one definition of bull 
and bear markets. Therefore, they proposed three alternative definitions of bull 
and bear market conditions. The first categorisation was based on market trends. 
The second ignored market trends and viewed a market portfolio return every 
month independently. The third procedure divided the sample into three subsets: 
(1) months when the market moved up substantially, (2) months when the market 
moved down substantially, and (3) months when the market moved neither up nor 
down substantially. Substantial moves were arbitrarily defined as months when 
the absolute value of a market return was larger than half of one standard devia-
tion of the market’s returns measured over the total sampled period (Fabozzi – 
Francis 1977). Also, Lunde – Timmermann (2000) stressed that there is no gener-
ally accepted formal definition of bull and bear markets in the finance literature. 
In one paper (Cooper et al. 2004), a bull (“up”) or a bear (“down”) market was 
identified when the past 12-, 24-, or 36-month market return was non-negative 
or negative, respectively. The identification of market states (in other words, of 
cycles in equity prices) is a problem of considerable importance, as Cooper et al. 
(2004), among others, found that profits to investment strategies depend critically 
on the state of the market.
Pagan – Sossounov (2003) developed an algorithm that seemed to be useful in 
locating periods in time that were considered bull and bear markets in US equity 
prices. They tested the monthly data of the New York market index (S&P500) in 
the period from January 1835 to May 1997. Lee et al. (2011) proposed a modified 
version of the Pagan–Sossounov method of dividing market states into bullish, 
bearish, and range-bound markets. They analysed the Taiwanese market in the 
period January 1997–December 2007. They stressed that investors usually cannot 
identify the present market state, and that they often refer to past market states as 
they make investment decisions. Lunde – Timmermann (2000) created an algo-
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rithm for detecting bull and bear states. They investigated a new type of long-run 
dependence in stock prices based on the distribution of time spent in markets 
where cumulated returns exceed some positive threshold value (bull states), or 
fall below some negative threshold value (bear states).
We employ a three-stage procedure of dividing market states into bullish and 
bearish markets (Olbryś – Majewska 2014). Our methodology builds on Pagan 
– Sossounov (2003). The bullish (bearish) market state refers to a continuous up-
trend (downtrend) in the market index. In the first step, we conduct a preliminary 
identification of turning points, i.e. peaks and troughs, based on the conditions 
(1)–(2), respectively:
 8 1 1 8ln , , ln ln ln , , lnt t t t tP P P P P       (1)
 8 1 1 8ln , , ln ln ln , , lnt t t t tP P P P P       (2)
where Pt represents the market index of month t, and from successive peaks/
troughs we choose the highest/deepest one, respectively. Pagan – Sossounov 
(2003) stressed that in the cycle literature, an algorithm for describing turning 
points in time series was developed by Bry – Boschan (1971), but they modified 
this algorithm by taking the eight months window (instead of six) in marking the 
initial location of turning points. The main goal was not to smooth any of the 
monthly, already smoothed, data. 
In the second step, we exclude the phases (peak–trough or trough–peak) that 
last for less than four months, and cycles (peak–trough–peak or trough–peak–
trough) that last for less than sixteen months. Pagan – Sossounov (2003) pointed 
out that in cycle dating, the minimal cycle length is fifteen months, hence sixteen 
months were chosen to create a symmetric window of eight periods. Furthermore, 
they advocated four months as the minimal length of a phase. 
In the last step, we calculate the amplitudes A for each phase (amplitude is the 
difference in the natural logs of the index value in subsequent turning points). 
During the bull/bear market period there must be a large enough (of at least 20%) 
rise/fall in the index value (Pagan – Sossounov 2003: 26). This means that the 
amplitude of a given phase must fulfil the condition A ≥ 0.18 or A ≤ –  0.22 for the 
bull or bear market period, respectively. Indeed, if a growth of the index value in 
an up-market period will equal at least 20%, then
 
  
1
1
1.2ln ln ln ln ln1.2 0.18.t tt t
t t
P PA P P
P P


     
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By analogy, if a decline of the index value in a down-market period will equal at 
least 20%, then
 
1
1
0.8ln ln ln ln ln 0.8 0.22.t tt t
t t
P PA P P
P P


      
4. THE EFFECT OF INCREASING CROSS-MARKET CORRELATIONS 
IN THE CRISIS PERIOD
International equity market correlation is a very important topic because of many 
practical implications, especially in the context of international portfolio diversifi-
cation. “Typically, portfolio diversification is achieved using two main strategies: 
investing in different classes of assets thought to have little of negative correlation 
or investing in similar classes of assets in multiple markets through international 
diversification. While these two strategies have solid theoretical justification and 
strong empirical evidence exists as to the benefits, investors must be aware that 
correlation is dynamic and varies over time, changing the amount of portfolio 
diversification within a given asset allocation. In particular, a number of studies 
document that correlation between equity returns increases during bear markets 
and decreases when stock exchanges rally” (Cappiello et al. 2006: 7). Longin – 
Solnik (2001) studied the conditional correlation structure of international equity 
returns and derived a formal statistical method, based on the extreme value theo-
ry. They investigated monthly equity index returns for five countries: the US, the 
UK, France, Germany, and Japan, in the period January 1959–December 1996. 
They found that conditional correlation increases in bear markets, but not in bull 
markets. Based on data for international equity markets (i.e. the US, the UK, 
France, and Germany), and major stock market indexes in the period from May 
1990 to December 1999, Campbell et al. (2002) found evidence of significant 
increased correlation in international equity returns in bear markets. Goetzmann 
et al. (2005) examined the correlation structure of the major world markets over 
150 years. They found that international equity correlations change dramatically 
through time, thus the diversification benefits to global investing are not constant. 
Hong et al. (2007) provided a model-free test for asymmetric correlations in bear 
versus bull markets. They evaluated the economic significance of incorporating 
asymmetries into investment decisions.
Although there is no unanimity in research regarding the reasons of increasing 
cross-market correlations in crisis periods, the majority of researchers agree that 
correlations change dramatically during crucial market events. This evidence is 
often justified by the authors as the consequence of contagion (e.g. Bekaert et 
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al. 2005; Kizys – Pierdzioch 2011). On the other hand, Forbes – Rigobon (2002) 
showed that correlation coefficients are conditional on market volatility. As a 
result, during a crisis, when stock market volatility increases, estimates of cross-
market correlations will be biased upward. The authors analysed international 
markets in the context of contagion, but they found that there was no increase in 
unconditional correlation coefficients (i.e. no contagion) during the 1997 Asian 
crisis, the 1994 Mexican devaluation, and the 1987 US market crash. As a matter 
of fact, contagion is not simply revealed by increased correlation of market re-
turns during a crisis period (e.g. Edwards 2000; Bekaert et al. 2005) and referenc-
es therein. As Bekaert et al. (2005: 39–40) pointed out, one of the most interesting 
aspects of the contagion debate is the disagreement over a precise definition. 
They defined contagion as excess correlation, that is, correlation over and above 
what one would expect from economic fundamentals. Edwards (2000) presented 
some important stylised facts concerning contagion. Among others, Rigobon 
(2002: 4) stressed that “there is no accordance on what contagion means”. Fur-
thermore, Forbes – Rigobon (2002) defined contagion as a significant increase 
in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or group of countries), but 
they stated that this definition is not universally accepted. They stressed that het-
eroskedasticity in market returns biases tests for contagion based on correlation. 
The authors proposed the following correction for the volatility bias:
  (3)
where ˆVAρ  is the unconditional volatility-adjusted cross-correlation coefficient be-
tween markets, ˆCρ  is the estimated conditional cross-correlation coefficient in the 
crisis period, and δ is the relative increase in the variance of market returns in the 
crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period:
  (4)
where 2 2ˆ ˆ,C PCσ σ  are the variances in the high-volatility (crisis) and low-volatility 
(pre-crisis) periods, respectively. By construction, it is obvious that 2 2ˆ ˆC PCσ σ , 
hence δ ≥ 0 and ˆ ˆVA Cρ ρ , that is, during the periods of high volatility, the uncon-
ditional volatility-adjusted cross-correlation ˆVAρ  will be smaller than the estimated 
conditional cross-correlation ˆCρ  between markets. The evaluation of contagion is 
carried out by testing the hypotheses:
  (5)
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where ρPC is the cross-correlation coefficient in the pre-crisis period, and the null 
hypothesis states that there is no contagion. The Z-statistic, which is asymptoti-
cally a standard normal random variable, tests the null of no contagion, that is, the 
equality of the crisis with pre-crisis cross-market correlation coefficients (South-
all 2008: 47). The test is performed with the Fisher (1921) z-transformation of 
sample correlation coefficients. If the value of the Z-statistic is greater than the 
critical value, the null hypothesis of identical correlation coefficients can be re-
jected.
It is worthwhile to note that according to the literature, some researchers ex-
plain the changing nature of correlations between international markets over the 
evolution of the global financial crisis in terms of the influence of news, and they 
often employ the “event study” or similar methodology (e.g. Bartram – Bod-
nar 2009; Dooley – Hutchison 2009; Mun – Brooks 2012). For example, Mun 
– Brooks (2012) explored the relative roles of news and volatility in explain-
ing the changes in correlations between national stock markets during the global 
2007–2008 financial crisis. Their analysis focused on the changing nature of cor-
relations across four distinct phases of the global financial crisis.
5. DATA DESCRIPTION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON THE MAIN 
INDEXES OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP AND US STOCK MARKETS
As mentioned earlier, four Visegrad countries among eight emerging markets 
were successful in the negotiations with the EU and they accessed the EU on 
May 1, 2004. These four Visegrad countries, in order of decreasing population 
size are: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. The data consists 
of monthly logarithmic returns of the major V-4 stock market indexes (WIG, 
PX, BUX, and SAX), and the New York market index (S&P500). There are 108 
monthly observations for each series for the period beginning May 2004 and 
ending April 2013 (nine years). All analyses are conducted using the open-source 
computer software Gretl 1.9.14 (Adkins 2013). 
5.1 Preliminary statistics
Table 1 presents brief information about the major Visegrad Group stock market 
indexes, in order of decreasing value of market capitalisation at the end of 2012.
Table 2 reports summarised statistics for the monthly logarithmic returns for 
five stock indexes: S&P500, WIG, PX, BUX, and SAX, as well as statistics test-
ing for normality and interdependence.
556 J. OLBRYŚ – E. MAJEWSKA
Acta Oeconomica 65 (2015)
Table 1. The major Visegrad Group stock market indexes used in the study
Market
Market Cap., 
EUR billion, 
Dec. 2012
Index Some details of the index construction
1 Warsaw 134.8 WIG
The Warsaw Stock Exchange weighted index with rela-
tive weights based on the capitalisation of listed shares. 
It contains all listed companies, except companies with 
free-float below 10%. 
2 Prague 28.2 PX The Prague Stock Exchange price index of blue-chip issues, weighted by market capitalisation.  
3 Budapest 15.7 BUX
The official index of blue-chip shares listed on the Buda-
pest Stock Exchange. It is calculated based on the actual 
market prices of a basket of shares. It is an index with 
market capitalisation weighting corrected for free-float.
4 Bratislava 4.1 SAX
The official share index of the Bratislava Stock Ex-
change. It is a capital-weighted index that compares the 
market capitalisation of a selected set of shares with the 
market capitalisation of the same shares as of a given 
reference day.
Source: http://www.gpw.pl/; http://www.pse.cz/; http://bse.hu/; http://www.bsse.sk/; http://fese.eu/en/; http://
www.world-exchanges.org 
Table 2. Summarised statistics for monthly logarithmic returns for five stock indexes
Index Mean Standard deviation Skewness
Excess 
kurtosis Doornik–Hansen test LB(5) LB
2(5)
S&P500 0.003 0.044 –1.05[0.00]
2.55
[0.00]
16.18
[0.00]
13.84
[0.02]
37.90
[0.00]
WIG 0.006 0.065 –0.72[0.00]
2.56
[0.00]
16.62
[0.00]
14.29
[0.01]
5.96
[0.31]
PX 0.002 0.070 –1.24[0.00]
4.12
[0.00]
21.79
[0.00]
14.54
[0.01]
25.95
[0.00]
BUX 0.005 0.075 –0.94[0.00]
2.82
[0.00]
16.27
[0.00]
7.40
[0.19]
2.50
[0.78]
SAX 0.001 0.057 0.86[0.00]
6.54
[0.00]
61.23
[0.00]
24.45
[0.00]
7.57
[0.18]
Notes: Based on all sample observations during the period May 2004–April 2013. 
The test statistic for skewness and excess kurtosis is the conventional t-statistic. The Doornik–Hansen test 
(2008) has a χ2 distribution if the null hypothesis of normality is true. Numbers in brackets are p-values. LB(q) 
and LB2(q) are the Ljung – Box (1978) statistics for returns and squared returns, respectively, distributed as χ2 
(q), q≈lnT, where T = 108 is the number of data points. The χ2 (5) critical value is 11.07 (5%).
Source: Authors’ calculations (using Gretl 1.9.14 software).
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Several results in Table 2 are worth special notice. The sample means are not 
statistically different from zero. The measure for skewness shows that all return 
series are skewed, and the measure for excess kurtosis shows that all series are 
highly leptokurtic with respect to the normal distribution. The Doornik–Hansen 
(2008) test rejects normality for each of the return series at the 5% level of signifi-
cance. The Ljung–Box (1978) statistic at the lag q ≈ ln T, where T is the number 
of data points (Tsay 2010), calculated for both the return and the squared return 
series, indicates the presence of significant linear dependencies only in the case 
of the BUX series. The hypothesis of non-linear dependencies is rejected in the 
case of the S&P500 and PX series.
5.2 Bear market periods during the 2007–2009 fi nancial crisis 
in the Visegrad Group and the US stock markets
We employ the procedure of dividing market states into bullish and bearish mar-
kets to identify crisis periods on the stock exchanges. Figures 1–5 present the 
crisis periods for the S&P500 and the V-4 stock market indexes obtained from the 
three-stage procedure described in Section 2. The empirical results are generated 
in the whole sample period from May 2004 to April 2013. The horizontal axis 
stands for time (months), and the vertical axis stands for the market index. Verti-
cal lines and light grey areas stand for crisis periods.
As it is necessary to appoint one month as the beginning of the global crisis 
period for all countries, we propose October 2007. In the light of our results, it 
seems that we can treat February 2009 as the end of the global crisis period, which 
is consistent with Dooley – Hutchison’s (2009) results, among others. Finally, we 
propose October 2007–February 2009 as the common period of the recent global 
financial crisis for the US and the CEE-3 countries (see Figures 1–4).
Figure 1. S&P500 index (New York)
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Figure 2. WIG index (Warsaw)
Figure 3. PX index (Prague)
Figure 4. BUX index (Budapest)
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Only in the case of Slovakia (Figure 5) can we observe a pronounced delay 
of crisis symptoms. However, it is not surprising if we take into account that the 
Slovakian stock market is the smallest in the group. Smith (2009) stressed that 
European emerging stock markets can be usefully classified into three groups: 
(1) Russia, (2) four medium-size markets: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Turkey, (3) a group of 19 small, new markets, including Slovakia. Further-
more, the evidence is that for Slovakia, which accessed the euro area in Janu-
ary 1, 2009, the crisis period is much longer and it includes the recent euro area 
crisis. According to the literature, a balance-of-payments and a fiscal crisis within 
the EMU started in Spring 2010 (e.g. Merler – Pisani-Ferry 2012).
Moreover, we identify the following additional down-market periods in the 
sample investigated (cf. Figures 1–4): (1) the period April 2011–September 
2011 for the S&P500 index (↓ 17.0%); (2) the period May 2011–Dec 2011 for 
the WIG index (↓ 24.8%); (3) the period April 2010–May 2012 for the PX index 
(↓ 32.2%), and (4) the period April 2010–September 2011 for the BUX index 
(↓ 36.3%). In our opinion, while the mentioned additional bear market period on 
the New York Stock Exchange was certainly not connected with the euro area 
crisis, we have some doubts in the case of Prague and Budapest. Although the 
Czech Republic and Hungary are not EMU countries, April 2010 is accepted 
in the literature as the beginning of the euro zone crisis period (e.g. Merler – 
Pisani-Ferry 2012, among others). Hence, it is very likely that the subsequent 
down-market periods for Prague and Budapest were connected with the euro 
zone crisis (see Figures 3–4). 
Figure 5. SAX index (Bratislava)
Notes: Figures 1–5 present crisis periods and down-markets for the S&P500 and the V-4 stock market indexes 
obtained from the three-stage procedure of dividing market states, in the whole sample period May 2004–April 
2013. The horizontal axis stands for time (months), and the vertical axis stands for the market index. Vertical 
lines and light grey areas stand for crisis periods or down-markets.
560 J. OLBRYŚ – E. MAJEWSKA
Acta Oeconomica 65 (2015)
5.3 Correctness analysis
We employ two methods for checking the bear market conditions, proposed by 
Fabozzi – Francis (1977): (1) the substantial moves procedure, and (2) the up- 
and down-market procedure. 
As for the first procedure, we obtained that during the down-market months 
the absolute value of expected market return was larger than half of one standard 
deviation of the stock market returns measured over the total sampled period, 
for all markets investigated. In the case of the S&P500 index, the absolute value 
of the expected return |–  0.043| was even almost equal to the standard deviation 
0.044. According to the second procedure, the expected index returns were nega-
tive during the crisis periods for all stock markets investigated. Therefore, the de-
termined periods were placed in the down category. Finally, the empirical results 
of both procedures confirmed the bear market periods presented in Figures 1–5.
5.4 Contemporaneous and volatility-adjusted cross-market correlations
As noted in Section 4, the evidence of significant increased correlation in inter-
national equity markets in bear market periods is well documented. Our goal is to 
confirm this observation during the recent 2007 US subprime crisis period for the 
V-4 and the US stock markets. We advocate October 2007–February 2009 as the 
common period of the recent global financial crisis, except for Slovakia.
The most important results are presented in Table 3, which contains standard 
contemporaneous cross-correlations and volatility-adjusted cross-correlation co-
efficients, given by Eq. (3) of monthly logarithmic returns on pairs of the indexes 
S&P500/V-4 stock market index (excluding SAX). For comparison, we calcu-
late dependencies both in the whole sample (May 2004–April 2013) and in two 
subsamples of equal size: (1) the pre-crisis period May 2006–September 2007 
(17 months), and (2) the common crisis period October 2007–February 2009 (17 
months). We investigate the cross-market linkages after a shock to the US finan-
cial market. Supporting values are equal to 2ˆ 0.00362PCσ   (the variance in the 
high-volatility period in the US stock market) and 2ˆ 0.00053PCσ   (the variance 
in the low-volatility period in the US stock market), while the relative increase 
in the variance of S&P500, given by Eq. (4), is equal to 5.8663δ  . Our results 
confirm that during the period of high volatility in the US stock market (the com-
mon crisis period October 2007–February 2009), the estimated conditional cross-
correlations between the US and CEE-3 markets were substantially greater than 
the unconditional volatility-adjusted correlations, given by Eq. (3).
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Table 3. Contemporaneous cross-correlations and volatility-adjusted cross-correlations of monthly 
logarithmic returns on pairs S&P500/V-4 stock market index (excluding SAX)
Index
Contemporaneous cross-correlations Volatility-adjusted cross-
correlations
Whole 
sample 
(1)
Pre-
crisis 
(2)
Crisis (3) Crisis (3)
Increase 
compared 
to the 
period (2) Z-
st
at
is
tic
C
on
ta
gi
on Increase 
compared 
to the 
period (2) Z-
st
at
is
tic
C
on
ta
gi
on
1 WIG 0.767 [0.000]
0.438
[0.079]
0.850
[0.000] ↑94.1% 2.081 H1 0.524 ↑19.7% 0.298 H0
2 PX 0.750 [0.000]
0.672
[0.003]
0.894
[0.000] ↑33.0% 1.659 H1 0.606 ↑9.9% –0.297 H0
3 BUX 0.744 [0.000]
0.405
[0.107]
0.817
[0.000] ↑101.7% 1.900 H1 0.476 ↑17.4% 0.232 H0
Notes: The table is based on: (1) the whole sample period May 2004–April 2013; (2) the pre-crisis period May 
2006–September 2007 (17 months); (3) the common crisis period October 2007–February 2009 (17 months). 
The table contains contemporaneous correlation coefficients as well as volatility-adjusted cross-correlation co-
efficient ˆPAρ , given by Eq. (3), p-values are in brackets. Fisher’s Z-statistic (1921) tests the null of no contagion. 
The Student’s t critical value is 1.3125 (at the 10% significance level).
Source: Authors’ calculations (using Gretl 1.9.14 software).
Several results in Table 3 are especially important. In the case of contempora-
neous cross-market correlations, the test based on the Z-statistic rejects the null 
of no contagion in the crisis period for each of the return series, at the 10% level 
of significance. The Student’s t critical value is 1.3125 in this case. However, 
there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis for volatility-adjusted cross-market 
correlations (the last column in Table 3). It means that the Forbes–Rigobon cor-
rection for heteroskedastic bias in index returns leads to substantial reduction in 
differences among cross-market correlation coefficients in both periods, and the 
conclusions concerning contagion effect are completely different. The correlation 
coefficients show that contagion is significant in all economies when within-sam-
ple heteroskedasticity is ignored. Our results are consistent with those of Forbes 
– Rigobon (2002) among others and confirm that accommodating heteroskedas-
ticity is crucial for detecting contagion across international stock markets.
Table 4 reports standard contemporaneous cross-correlations of monthly loga-
rithmic returns on pairs of the CEE-3 stock market indexes. As in Table 3, we 
calculate dependencies both in the whole sample (May 2004–April 2013) and 
ρˆ ˆPCρ ˆCρ ˆPAρ
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in two subsamples of equal size: (1) the pre-crisis period May 2006–September 
2007, and (2) the common crisis period October 2007–February 2009. As we can 
observe in Table 4, there was an increase in cross-market contemporaneous corre-
lations during the common crisis period October 2007–February 2009 compared 
to the pre-crisis period.
Table 5 presents standard contemporaneous cross-correlations of monthly 
logarithmic returns on S&P500/V-4 stock market index pairs within the bear 
market phases identified for each particular market, not for the common period. 
Therefore, the Slovak stock market is investigated as well. The main evidence 
is that correlation coefficients are statistically significant in all cases, but for the 
S&P500/SAX pair, the value of the coefficient is the lowest one.
Table 4. Contemporaneous cross-correlations of monthly logarithmic returns on pairs 
of the CEE-3 stock market indexes
Period WIG/PX WIG/BUX PX/BUX
1 Whole sample 
May 2004–April 2013
0.843
[0.000]
0.804
[0.000]
0.783
[0.000]
2 Pre-crisis period 
May 2006–September 2007
0.794
[0.000]
↑14.2%
0.591
[0.012]
↑44.5%
0.642
[0.006]
↑31.6%
3 Common crisis period 
October 2007–February 2009
0.907
[0.000]
0.854
[0.000]
0.845
[0.000]
Notes: The table is based on: (1) the whole sample period May 2004–April 2013; (2) the pre-crisis period May 
2006–September 2007 (17 months); (3) the common crisis period October 2007–February 2009 (17 months). 
The table contains contemporaneous correlation coefficients and p-values in brackets.
Source: Authors’ calculations (using Gretl 1.9.14 software)
Table 5. Contemporaneous cross-correlations of monthly logarithmic returns on pairs S&P500/
V-4 stock market index (including SAX)
S&P500/WIG S&P500/PX S&P500/BUX S&P500/SAX
Period
June 2007–February 
2009
(21 months)
October 2007–
February 2009
(17 months)
July 2007–February 
2009
(20 months)
March 2008–
February 2013
(60 months)
0.822
[0.000]
0.894
[0.000]
0.798
[0.000]
0.389
[0.002]
Notes: The table is based on the bear market periods for each stock market investigated separately, according 
to Figures 2–5. The table contains contemporaneous correlation coefficients and p-values in brackets.
Source: Authors’ calculations (using Gretl 1.9.14 software).
ρˆ
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6. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was a formal statistical identification of bear market 
periods during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. We analysed the V-4 mar-
kets and, for comparison, the US stock market. The period investigated (May 
2004–April 2013) includes the 2007 US subprime crisis period. We use the Pagan 
– Sossounov (2003) methodology of dividing market states into bullish and bear-
ish markets, and our results reveal October 2007–February 2009 as the common 
down-market period of the recent financial crisis on the stock markets in the US, 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (i.e. CEE-3 countries). Only in the case 
of Slovakia can we observe a pronounced delay of crisis symptoms. However, it 
is not surprising, given that the Slovakian market is in the group of the smallest 
European stock markets. Furthermore, the evidence is that for Slovakia, which 
accessed the euro area on January 1, 2009, the crisis period is much longer and it 
includes the recent euro area crisis. Moreover, we identify additional down-market 
periods in the sample investigated for the CEE-3 and US stock markets. To sum 
up, the procedure seems to be useful in locating bear market periods in time.
The precise identification of market states (in other words, cycles in equity 
prices) is certainly important in practice, as many researchers found that profits to 
investment strategies depend critically on the state of the market. Unfortunately, 
due to the global nature of the crisis causes, diversification provided little help 
to investors when needed most, as markets dropped in tandem (Bartram – Bod-
nar 2009). Moreover, it is instructive to formally identify crises, as it enables 
the examination of various relationships and linkages among international stock 
markets, taking into consideration the pre-, post-, and crisis periods. According to 
the empirical finance literature, it is important to verify to what extent the results 
obtained during research depend on the choice of the period investigated. As a 
matter of fact, researchers quite often establish the pre-, post-, and crisis periods 
arbitrarily. Due to the importance of the problem, a possible direction for further 
investigation would be to identify market states applying other methods, for ex-
ample, a Markov-switching model approach (Maheu – McCurdy 2000).
Our empirical findings confirm significant and high cross-market contempora-
neous correlations during the common down-market period October 2007–Febru-
ary 2009. Moreover, we show that the correlation structure between the US and the 
V-4 stock markets is time-varying, especially during crises. We identify a statisti-
cally significant increase in cross-market contemporaneous correlations during the 
common crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. However, the correlation 
coefficients show that contagion is significant in all economies when within-sam-
ple heteroskedasticity is ignored, but the Forbes – Rigobon’s (2002) correction for 
heteroskedastic bias in index returns leads to a substantial reduction in differences 
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among cross-market correlations in both periods. Hence, the conclusions concern-
ing the contagion effect are substantially different. Our results directly confirm 
that accommodating heteroskedasticity is crucial for detecting contagion across 
economies. It is worthwhile to emphasise that high and asymmetric cross-market 
correlations have important negative aspects because of their practical implica-
tions in the light of market globalisation. First, they thwart investors’ striving for 
international portfolio diversification in crises. Second, the asymmetry effect, i.e. 
significant increase in international cross-correlations in bear markets, addition-
ally makes portfolio diversification especially difficult and questionable.
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